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Abstract. This paper explores the impact of the 2007 European Union enlargement on
the consumption behaviour of immigrant households. Using data from a unique Italian
survey and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the enlargement induced
a significant consumption increase for the immigrant households from new member
states both in the short and in the medium run. This enlargement effect cannot be
attributed to the mere legalization as it concerns both undocumented and documented
immigrants, albeit through different channels. Detailed information on immigrants’ le-
gal status (undocumented/documented) and sector of employment (informal/formal)
allows us to shed light on the exact mechanisms. Following the enlargement, previously
undocumented immigrants experienced an increase in the labour income by moving from
the informal towards the formal economy, whereas immigrants who were already working
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legally in Italy benefited from the increased probability of getting a permanent contract.
Enhanced employment stability in turn reduced the uncertainty about future labour
income leading to an increase in documented immigrants’ consumption expenditure.
Résumé. Plus qu’un simple permis de travail : la citoyenneté européenne et le comporte-
ment de consommation des immigrants avec et sans papiers. Cet article s’intéresse aux
conséquences de l’élargissement de l’Union Européenne de 2007 sur le comportement
de consommation des ménages d’immigrants. Grâce aux données d’une étude italienne
exclusive, et nous appuyant sur la méthode des doubles différences, nous avons dé-
couvert que l’élargissement avait entraîné une hausse de la consommation des ménages
d’immigrants en provenance des nouveaux pays membres, à court comme à moyen terme.
Cet effet d’élargissement ne repose pas uniquement sur une simple régularisation
puisqu’il concerne à la fois les immigrants avec et sans papiers, mais sur d’autres facteurs
distincts. Grâce à des informations plus détaillées sur le statut juridique des immigrants
(avec ou sans papiers) nous pouvons apporter un éclairage sur les mécanismes précis. À
la suite de l’élargissement, et grâce à la transition de l’économie informelle à l’économie
officielle, les immigrants anciennement sans papiers virent les revenus de leur travail
augmenter. Dans le même temps, les immigrants travaillant déjà légalement en Italie
purent profiter de meilleures possibilités d’obtenir un contrat à durée indéterminée. Cette
stabilité d’emploi accrue a permis de réduire l’incertitude liée aux revenus du travail avec
pour conséquence une hausse des dépenses de consommation des immigrants en situation
régulière.
JEL classification: D12, E21, F22
1. IntroductionS
Since the life-cycle model developed by Modigliani and Brumberg(1954) and the permanent income hypothesis introduced by Friedman
(1957), there have been many studies trying to understand how households’
consumption responds to income changes.1 One important testable
implication of the life-cycle model/permanent income hypothesis is that
consumption should respond to unpredictable changes in the variables about
which the consumer is uncertain.
Despite the large literature on the economic analysis of immigration, little
is known about immigrant households’ consumption behaviour in the host
economy and how it responds to changes in uncertainty. In principle, a high
level of uncertainty can depress the economic activity of households, including
their consumption. When economic decisions are costly to revert, high uncer-
tainty may induce individuals to postpone their decisions until uncertainty
is sufficiently resolved and more information is available (Bernanke 1983).
Immigrants tend to face higher economic uncertainty than native-born, which
may affect their consumption behaviour.2 On the one hand, undocumented
1 Meghir (2004) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) provide excellent surveys of
this literature.
2 Dustmann (1997) develops a model of return migration and shows that in fact
immigrants may engage in more precautionary savings due to higher income
uncertainty.
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immigrants are constantly at risk of being apprehended and subsequently
deported, and when employed, they work in the informal economy and earn
lower salaries (Dell’Aringa and Neri 1987). Legalization procedures differ by
country but are costly and burdensome in general. On the other hand, docu-
mented immigrants are allowed to stay in the host country for a prespecified
period of time and are obliged to leave when their permit expires. Permits can
be renewable but this is usually subject to fulfilling certain conditions such as
earning high-enough income and/or not entailing in any criminal activity.
One of the fundamental principles of the European Union (EU) enables
immigrants from the member states to live and work in the EU without the
need of a work permit and grants them the right to equal treatment with
native-born in employment, wages and working conditions.3 Thus, the EU
accession plausibly implies an improvement in the employment prospects of
citizens from new member states, while reducing the degree of uncertainty and
the precautionary savings motive. This could translate into higher income and
thus into an increase in consumption, in particular among the undocumented
immigrants, who could now move into the formal sector. In the case of doc-
umented immigrants, the reduced labour market uncertainty coupled with a
higher probability of getting a permanent contract may also boost household
consumption expenditure through an increase in expected income stability in
the future.4 As a result, extending citizenship rights might have an important
impact on domestic demand. Despite its relevance, the link between citizenship
and consumption has been largely overlooked empirically. Using data from a
unique survey in Italy and employing a difference-in-differences approach, we
study whether and through which channels the extension of EU citizenship
affected the consumption behaviour of immigrant households following the
2007 enlargement. In our research design, we restrict our sample to immigrants
who arrived in Italy before 2007 and compare the monthly consumption
of households from new member states (Romania and Bulgaria) and can-
didate countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Mace-
donia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey), before and after the enlargement.5 ,6
3 Article 45, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex article 39 of
TEC and ex article 48 of EEC); see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/
tfeu_2008/art_45/oj.
4 See Campos and Reggio (2015) for the relationship between labour market
uncertainty and consumption and Barceló and Villanueva (2016) for the effect
of permanent contracts on household consumption and wealth accumulation.
5 A similar identification strategy has been adopted by recent papers that study
the labour market effects of the 2004 enlargement (see Elsner 2013a and 2013b,
Ruhs 2017, Ruhs and Wadsworth 2018).
6 Although Iceland is among the candidate countries, their nationals can work in
Italy as well as in other EU countries since they belong to the European
Economic Area. Therefore, we do not consider Icelanders as part of our control
group.
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We test the validity of our identification strategy by addressing anticipation
and composition effects as well as spillover effects by using immigrants from
A8 countries as an alternative control group and by exploiting heterogeneity
across regions and occupations.7 Italy provides an ideal context to study the
effects of the 2007 enlargement as it has long been one of the main destinations
for both Romanians and Bulgarians, even before 2007. Moreover, although
the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria was an expected event, its labour
market consequences in Italy were not, and the EU accession unexpectedly
implied for Romanians and Bulgarians full rights to work(see section 3 for a
discussion).
Our unique dataset allows us to focus both on documented immigrants,
for whom citizenship implies mainly that they do not need to renew their
permits any more, and on undocumented immigrants, who benefited from
legalization. Furthermore, detailed information on labour market outcomes,
including the sector of employment (informal/formal), allows us to shed light
on the exact mechanisms. We find that the EU accession significantly in-
creased average monthly consumption of immigrant households in the year
of accession, but also a few years later, in line with the presence of liquidity
constraints. The increase in consumption involved both undocumented and
documented immigrants albeit through different channels. Specifically, the
former increased their expenditure on food, clothes and other basic-need items
due to increased labour income. We provide evidence that this was achieved
mainly by moving from the informal towards the formal sector. Documented
immigrants instead, increased mostly the consumption of durable goods. In
their case, the underlying mechanism is a gradual increase in employment
stability through permanent job contracts, which reduces the uncertainty
about future labour income and thus, increases the propensity to consume.
In other words, the explanations for the rise in consumption rest on two
different mechanisms. First, workers move into better jobs (from informal
into formal and from temporary into permanent). The potential rise in income
from holding better jobs generates more spending on consumption. Second,
workers are moving into work situations that confer more income stability,
thus generating more consumption spending on account of a less pressing need
to save for a rainy day. Consistent with this, we also find that the probability of
holding savings and remitting goes down, in line with a reduced precautionary
savings motive.8 While legalization policies are usually difficult to implement
7 A8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia) joined the EU in 2004.
8 According to the literature, one of the reason why immigrants remit is to insure
themselves against risk. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) show that
remittances act as a form of family-provided insurance and self insurance.
Delpierre and Verheyden (2014) develop a model with endogenous remittances,
savings and return decisions under uncertainty and show that when migrants
face relatively low wage risks in the host country, they tend to remit less.
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due to the high political cost entailed, our results imply that simplifying the
bureaucratic procedure of work permits for documented immigrants may lead
to similar consumption increases. The labour market channel that our analysis
highlights is in line with Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015), who exploit the same
natural experiment and find that immigrant crime decreases due to increased
employment opportunities.
The literature on the consumption behaviour of immigrants is scarce due
mainly to data limitations. Two recent exceptions, exploiting the same dataset
that we use, are Dustmann et al. (2017) and Barigozzi and Speciale (2011).
Dustmann et al. (2017) use amnesty quotas to analyze the effect of immi-
grants’ legal status on their consumption behaviour in Italy and find that
undocumented immigrants consume about 40% less than documented immi-
grants and that this is partly due to their lower income. In our analysis, we
highlight an additional channel, that is the increased probability of getting a
permanent contract for immigrants that were documented even before their
home country accessed the EU. In the new legal framework, work permits
of citizens from new member countries were no longer of limited duration,
which plausibly made firms more willing to offer them permanent contracts.
Enhanced labour stability in turn decreased the uncertainty about future
labour income, and thus increased the propensity to consume. Barigozzi and
Speciale (2011) also focus on Italy and study the differences in the consump-
tion behaviour of native-born, documented and undocumented immigrants.
They find that the permanence in the host country plays an important role
in attenuating these differences. In our empirical exercise we control for years
of residence and show that the immigrants that benefited most from the EU
enlargement were those with less than five years of residence in Italy, who were
not eligible for permanent residence permits. Moreover, in a placebo exercise,
we find no effect among immigrants who held or were eligible to apply for
Italian citizenship.
Our findings also contribute to a very recent literature that studies the
labour market effects of faster access to citizenship as well as of different asy-
lum policies. This strand of the literature suggests that faster access to citizen-
ship improves the labour market attachment of female immigrants and their
investment in host-country–specific skills (Gathmann and Keller 2018). Sim-
ilarly, higher recognition and decision rates boost the employment prospects
and the economic integration of refugees (Fasani et al. 2018), while a lengthy
period before obtaining the right to work seems to hamper them (Ballatore
et al. 2017). We also explore alternative explanations, such as easier access to
credit, but the labour market channel remains the most plausible underlying
mechanism.
2. Background
Immigration is considered to be a structural characteristic of the Italian
society and labour market (Quassoli 1999). The empirical evidence shows that
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the demand for immigrant workers in the Italian labour market is concentrated
mainly on unskilled jobs (Fullin and Reyneri 2011) and, compared to employed
Italians, immigrant workers are more likely to be employed in sectors with low
pay, high job instability and weak employment protection (Ambrosini and
Barone 2007). Immigrant workers are also more exposed than native-born to
temporary employment contracts (Barone 2009), which are consistently found
to be associated with lower job satisfaction and greater difficulty in balancing
work and family and provide fewer opportunities for work-related training and
career advancement compared with permanent contracts.9 ,10
In relation to the legal framework for immigration, Italy offers various
types of residence permits, including those granted for work reasons, which
can be either temporary and need to be renewed in certain intervals (permesso
di soggiorno) or permanent (carta di soggiorno).11 Residence permits for work
reasons are subject to quotas set by the government each year for different
categories of immigrant workers (see, for a discussion, Pinotti 2017). The type
of employment contract has a direct effect on the frequency that residence
permits need to be renewed. The temporary residence permit for work reasons
has a validity of two years for immigrants working under an open-ended
(permanent) contract and a validity of one year for those with fixed-term
(temporary) contracts. Immigrants become eligible for a permanent permit of
unlimited duration after five years of legal residence in Italy and the successful
completion of an Italian language test.
Despite its comprehensive legal framework, as of January 2018, there were
an estimated 533,000 undocumented immigrants in Italy (ISMU 2018). Un-
documented immigrants enter the country either without a permit or on
a short-term visa (e.g., tourist or student visa) and then overstay despite
having expired documents (Fasani 2015, Fullin and Reyneri 2011). They tend
9 See Bentolila and Dolado 1994, Blanchard and Landier 2002, Bonet et al. 2013,
Booth et al. 2002 and Dolado et al. 2002.
10 In the late 1980s, Italy was considered to have one of the strictest labour
markets in terms of employment protection legislation (OECD 2004). To
provide more flexibility to employers, Italy relaxed the rules for the use of
temporary contracts in 1987, which, prior to this year, could be used only for
seasonal work, specific projects or temporary replacement of absent workers
(Kugler and Pica 2008). Since then, temporary contracts steadily increased as a
share of total employment (Cappellari et al. 2012). In the period of our analysis
(2001–2012), around 13% of the workforce was under temporary employment
contracts (Istat, Labour Force Survey; see http://dati.istat.it/?lang=en).
While the extended use of temporary contracts allowed for more flexibility in
the labour market, large differences in terms of employment protection
legislation between permanent and temporary contracts have been a concern
(Garibaldi and Taddei 2013).
11 Other types include those granted for family reasons (e.g., spouse or dependent
child of a legal resident) and special permits for study purposes and permits for
asylum seekers/humanitarian reasons.
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to choose countries where it is easy for them to work for a period, even
without a work permit, which they might obtain subsequently through reg-
ularization programmes or by finding an employer in the formal sector to
sponsor them (Levinson 2005). Although the immigrants’ legal status (docu-
mented/undocumented) and sector of employment (formal/informal) are not
necessarily reciprocal, the relatively large informal economy in Italy has been a
major factor in promoting undocumented immigration (Reyneri 1998).12 The
findings of recent studies suggest that once undocumented immigrants are
regularized, the majority move to the formal sector (Fullin and Reyneri 2011)
and stay in it (Di Porto et al. 2018). Overall, the evidence consistently shows
that, all else equal, undocumented immigrants have worse labour market
outcomes than documented immigrants.13
3. The natural experiment
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on January 1, 2007.14 In fact, the
EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria was an expected event as the acces-
sion negotiations were successfully concluded in 2004. However, the accession
treaties allowed member states to impose temporal labour market restrictions
on Bulgarian and Romanian workers for up to seven years after accession.
All EU states were required to open their labour markets to the citizens of
the two newest members by the end of 2013, but they had to give justifica-
tion if they wished to restrict access beyond 2011. The majority of member
states, including Italy, announced that would impose interim restrictions to
protect their labour markets from a large flow of immigrants from the new
member states and therefore Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants would still
be required to have a permit in order to work.15
However, just three days prior to the EU accession, on December 28, 2006,
the newly elected, centre–left government in Italy lifted the restrictions for
high skilled employment as well as in sectors where the vast majority of
Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants used to work, such as construction,
hotel and tourism, domestic work, care services, agriculture, engineering and
seasonal work. In these sectors, employers of Bulgarian and Romanian workers
simply needed to submit a copy of the employment contract to the local labour
12 A unique feature of our data is that we can observe both undocumented and
documented immigrants working in the informal/formal sector. In our sample,
all undocumented immigrants but also 14% of the documented immigrants
work in the informal sector.
13 See, for example, Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2007, Borjas and Tienda 1993, Fasani
2015, Guriev et al. 2019, Kaushal 2006, Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002.
14 Following the EU enlargement in 2007, Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants in
Italy were instantly granted with the EU citizenship and became documented
without the need of obtaining/renewing any residence permit.
15 Note that work permits were not transferable across member states.
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office. Migration quotas were maintained only in the manufacturing sector but
were eased so as to accommodate a larger number of workers from the new
member states.16 As a result, in 2007, Italy was the only major economy in
Europe to lift restrictions on workers from Romania and Bulgaria, granting
them in practice full rights to work in Italy.17 Not surprisingly, the number of
Romanian and Bulgarian residents in Italy has almost doubled between 2006
and 2007.18
The other countries that opened immediately their labour markets to the
citizens of the new member states were Finland and Sweden, as well as the
majority of member states that joined the EU in 2004. Nevertheless, among
all, Italy was the only country that had long been the main destination for
both Romanians and Bulgarians, even before the EU enlargement in 2007
(European Commission 2008). Spain, the other most preferred destination for
Romanians and Bulgarians, maintained restrictions until January 2009 and
reintroduced them again for workers from Romania in July 2011 until the
end of 2013. Figure B1 in the online appendix summarizes the timing of the
events.
4. Data and identification
4.1. The ISMU data
Our main data source is an annual survey launched in 2001 by a non-
governmental organization, the Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on
Multi-Ethnicity (ISMU) to study the foreign population residing in the
Lombardy region of Italy. Each survey consists of a random sample of about
8,000 immigrants (repeated cross section), who are aged 15 and over and reside
in Italy at the time of the interview. A unique feature of the ISMU survey is
that its sampling scheme was specifically designed to collect information on a
representative sample of both documented and undocumented immigrants (see
online appendix A). In order to obtain truthful answers from the respondents
on legal status and informal employment, no sensitive information is asked
(e.g., name and address) and the data are collected in public spaces by inter-
viewers with a foreign background, who have undergone specific training, and
emphasize the independence of ISMU from the government at the beginning
of the interview (see Dustmann et al. 2017, Guriev et al. 2019).
The ISMU data include rich information on personal characteristics such
as age, gender, education, marital status, country of origin, years of resi-
dence in Italy, residence permit as well as employment status and labour
16 Italy fully liberalized its labour market for citizens of Romania and Bulgaria as
of January 1, 2012.
17 See Migration Advisory Committee Report (2008) and House of Commons
Home Affairs Committee Report (2007). See also Mastrobuoni and Pinotti
(2015) for a similar discussion.
18 See Italian National Institute of Statistics, www.demo.istat.it/archivio.html.
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income.19 Information on the residence permits allows us to identify the
legal status of the respondents. In particular, we consider immigrants as
documented if they reported to have a valid residence permit (permanent
or temporary) at the time of the interview. Employed respondents were also
asked about their labour income, type of employment contract and occupation,
and importantly for our analysis, whether they work in the formal or in the
informal sector.
As the statistical unit of analysis in the ISMU surveys is the individual,
information on other family members is limited and therefore we do not
observe the employment status and the labour income of the spouse. Moreover,
information on household income is available, but only in the period after the
enlargement (2007 onwards) and not in the period before. Nevertheless, there
is information available on the number of household members living with the
respondent, the number of children (living with the respondent in Italy and
abroad), marital status and (for the married respondents) whether the spouse
is living with the respondent or abroad as well as whether the respondent is
living in own property. More importantly, from 2004 to 2012, respondents were
asked questions about their household consumption expenditure. In particu-
lar, the respondents had to report in euros their households’ average monthly
expenditure in Italy within the year of the interview on three broad categories
of consumption: (i) food, clothes and basic needs, (ii) housing such as rent,
mortgage, maintenance, bills and (iii) other items such as transportation,
leisure, instalment purchases and debt.20 ,21 Our main dependent variable is
the total consumption of immigrant households in the host country, i.e., the
sum of these three types of consumption expenditure, but we also explore each
of the disaggregated consumption categories separately. In our benchmark
estimates, we use the average monthly household consumption controlling
for the number of household members and cohabiting children as well as the
total number of children (cohabiting or not) and whether the spouse lives with
the respondent or abroad. We also check the sensitivity of our main results
using equivalized consumption (see section 7). Respondents were also asked
to report in euros their average monthly remittances as well as their monthly
savings in Italy. Information on monthly remittances is likely to be subject to
measurement error while there is no information on savings held in the home
19 The country of origin refers to the individual respondent rather than the whole
household. We nevertheless check the sensitivity of our results to the definition
of immigrant households by restricting the sample to immigrants who are living
with a partner from the same country of origin or singles/not living with a
partner (see section 7).
20 Throughout the paper, we use the term “durables” to refer to category (iii) as
it is likely to include large and long-term purchases such as cars or home
appliances, which are usually paid for in instalments.
21 The exact wording of these questions (in Italian and its English translation)
is presented in the online appendix table A2.
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country (see Dustmann et al. 2017 for a further discussion). Moreover, many
respondents report zero monthly remittances and/or savings. Therefore, in
section 6 we adopt a linear probability model as well as alternative models
that take censoring at zero into account to study the effect both on the
extensive and the intensive margin of savings and remittances. Nevertheless,
these results should be interpreted with caution due to the measurement of
these variables in the ISMU survey.
Two factors should be mentioned before going ahead. First, the ISMU
survey concerns only the Lombardy region of Italy. However, Lombardy can
be considered as a good approximation of the whole country as it is the most
populated and one of the largest and wealthiest regions of Italy, and has the
largest migrant population in the country accounting for 25% of the total
(IReR 2010).22 Second, due to the cross-sectional nature of the survey, we are
not able to trace the same individuals over time. Still, we are able to recover
some retrospective information on whether respondents in our sample were
documented and working in the formal sector before the EU enlargement.
In particular, given that there was no need for obtaining/renewing the work
permit in 2007 among the treated, we can infer that those with a valid work
permit in 2007 had obtained it beforehand. Moreover, we use the Social
Security records, which allow us to follow individuals over time, obtaining
some additional evidence regarding the labour market outcomes (wages and
type of contract).
4.2. Sample and identification
In our analysis, we use all nine waves (2004–2012) of the ISMU data that
include information on average monthly household expenditure to explore the
impact of the EU enlargement on the consumption of immigrant households
from new member states. Our treatment group consists of Romanians and
Bulgarians. A natural control group for new EU member countries is the EU
candidate member countries as they should be comparable on the basis of the
political and economic conditions (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti 2015). Moreover,
their attitudes towards risk before the enlargement should be similar to those
of Romanians and Bulgarians given their common migration choices.23 There-
22 See online appendix figure B2 for a map of Lombardy in Italy/Europe and
its 11 (12 since 2009) provinces.
23 There is a growing body of empirical literature supporting the existence of a
relationship between the migration decision and attitudes towards risk. For
instance, Jaeger et al. (2010) use direct measures of attitudes towards risk from
the 2004 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and find that
being more willing to take risks is a positive, statistically significant and
quantitatively important determinant of migration. Using the same data, Bonin
et al. (2009) show that first-generation immigrants are more risk averse than
native-born.
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FIGURE 1 Immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries residing
in Italy, average monthly consumption expenditure
NOTES: Sample includes immigrants from Romania, Bulgaria and candidate countries
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia
and Turkey) who arrived in Italy before 2007, who do not hold Italian citizenship by the
time of the interview and with no more than 10 years of residence in Italy by the time of
the EU accession. The vertical line represents the date of the EU accession of Romania
and Bulgaria (January 1, 2007). See text for variable definitions.
DATA SOURCE: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) 2004–2012 surveys
fore, immigrants from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey constitute our control group.
Since Italy experienced an expansion of migration from Romania and
Bulgaria following their accession to the EU, the causal effect of the EU
enlargement on the consumption of immigrant households would be contami-
nated by the different selection of new immigrants following the EU accession.
To address this issue, we restrict our sample to immigrants who arrived in Italy
before 2007, i.e., before Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. We also restrict
our sample to immigrants who do not hold Italian citizenship by the time of
the interview and with no more than 10 years of residence in Italy by the time
of the EU accession since a non-EU citizen, having legally resided in Italy for
10 years, is eligible to apply for the Italian citizenship.24
In figure 1, we present the average monthly consumption of immigrant
households in the host country for the treatment and the control groups, before
and after the enlargement for each year. As shown in panel A, Romanians
and Bulgarians living in Italy had lower average monthly consumption than
24 We use this excluded group to perform a placebo exercise in section 7.
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immigrants from EU candidate countries. The difference remained fairly con-
stant until 2007, suggesting that the consumption expenditure of treatment
and control groups were following parallel trends prior to the EU enlargement.
In 2007, with the EU accession, the average monthly consumption of the
treated group increased substantially, while the one of the control group
continued to grow at approximately the same rate as in the previous years
(panel A). This increase in total consumption was driven mainly by the
increase in the expenditure on food, clothing and other basic needs and on
transportation, leisure, instalment purchases and debt (panels B and D) and is
evident not only immediately after the EU accession but also in the following
years. By contrast, the immigrant households’ housing expenditure continued
to grow in the year of EU accession at approximately the same rate as in the
previous years, both for the treated and the control group (panel C).
Table 1 presents the means of all the variables included in our analysis
for the treated and control groups in our sample prior to (2004–2006) and
after (2007–2012) the EU enlargement (see online appendix table A3 for a
description of these variables). Focusing on the individual and household char-
acteristics, the treatment and control groups are similar to each other before
the EU enlargement in terms of age composition. However, there are notable
differences in other characteristics. Immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania
are more likely to be female and more educated than immigrants from EU
candidate countries. They are less likely to have a valid residence permit
(being documented) and they reside in Italy for a smaller average number of
years. Moreover, they tend to live in smaller households with fewer children.
In terms of employment outcomes, Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants have
lower labour income than immigrants from EU candidate countries and are
more likely to work under temporary contracts and in the informal sector.
Focusing on the before and after trends, the treated group experiences
higher consumption and labour income increases than the control group after
the enlargement. The share of females and the average years of residence
evolve in a similar way among the two groups while the composition by edu-
cation remains pretty stable over time. There is an increase in the fraction of
immigrants with at least one child and a decrease in the fraction of those with
spouses living abroad, especially in the treated group. These differences could
affect our analysis, as other things being equal, they would lead to an increase
in the number of household members that would translate mechanically into
an increase in household consumption expenditure. Therefore, in our analysis
we always control for the changing household structure and perform a series
of robustness checks on this issue.
In the next section, we account for compositional differences between the
treated and control groups and test the validity of the parallel trends assump-
tion using a regression framework, which reinforces the causal interpretation
of the effect of EU accession on the monthly consumption expenditure of
immigrants from new EU member countries. In what follows, we also examine
whether any trends in the observable characteristics of immigrants are the
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same across the treatment and control groups. In particular, we test the va-
lidity of our approach by analyzing whether the composition of Romanians and
Bulgarians changed in some systematic way following the EU enlargement.
5. Regression analysis
5.1. Short- and medium-term analyses
Since the observed differences in consumption presented in figure 1 may reflect
the underlying differences between the treatment and the control groups
rather than a treatment effect, it is important to control for individual and
household characteristics. For this purpose, we first focus on the short-term
impact of the EU accession (i.e., from year 2006 to 2007) and set our empirical
model as follows:
ln(cicpt)=α +βpostt +γnewEUc ×postt +
individual controls︷ ︸︸ ︷
Xicptθ
+ Zicptϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
household controls
+ φc︸︷︷︸
country of origin FE
+ ηp︸︷︷︸
province FE
+εicpt,
(1)
where i is an index for the households, c is the country of origin, p is the Italian
province of residence and t is the year of the interview. The dependent variable
ln cicpt is the natural logarithm of immigrant household i’s average monthly
consumption expenditure (total; food, clothing and other basic needs; housing
such as rent, mortgage, maintenance, bills; or other items such as transporta-
tion, leisure, instalment purchases and debt) in the host country. The variable
new EUc is an indicator for individuals in the treated group and postt is a
dummy variable that takes the value one in the year of enlargement (2007)
and zero in the year before (2006). The coefficient of the interaction between
the new EUc and postt is the short-term effect of the EU enlargement on the
consumption of immigrant households from the new member countries in the
host country. The term new EUc is not shown as its coefficient is absorbed by
the country of origin fixed effects, φc. The individual controls Xicpt include an
indicator for whether the respondent is a female, the respondent’s age and its
square, indicators for the respondent’s education categories (none, primary,
secondary and tertiary or above) and the respondent’s years of residence in
Italy. The household controls included in the vector Zicpt are the number of
household members, the total number of children living in Italy and abroad,
the number of children and the number of non-adult children living with
the respondent in Italy, an indicator for the spouse living abroad and an
indicator for home ownership in Italy. In our full specification, we also include
the respondent’s average monthly labour income in addition to individual and
household controls as a proxy for the household income. Finally, province of
residence in Italy is denoted as ηp and εicpt is an error term. As immigrants of
the same nationality are likely to reside in the same province, the consumption
expenditure may be correlated within country of origin groups but also within
16 E. Adamopoulou and E. Kaya
provinces. We thus cluster standard errors by Italian province of residence
and country of origin using the two-way method proposed by Cameron et al.
(2011).25
In equation (1), the coefficient β is the shared effect of the EU enlargement.
The main coefficient of interest is the difference-in-differences coefficient γ,
which compares the monthly consumption of immigrant households from
new member states and EU candidate countries in the host country, before
and after the EU enlargement. Table 2 presents the short-term estimates
in separate panels for total consumption and for the broad categories of
consumption expenditure. In each panel, we include country of origin and
Italian residence of province fixed effects, and gradually add individual and
household controls. In the last column of each panel, we also control for the
respondent’s average monthly labour income net of taxes.26
As shown in panel A of table 2, the coefficient of the interaction term
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that Romanian and
Bulgarian households living in Italy increased their total consumption with
the EU accession. The estimated effects are fairly similar across specifications
which can be taken as a first indication that our findings are not driven
by the changes in the composition of immigrants after the EU enlargement.
Using the full specification (panel A, column 4), we find an increase in total
consumption of around 8.9%, which is consistent with the presence of liquidity
constraints.27 The remaining panels of table 2 focus on broad categories of the
25 In all specifications, unless stated otherwise, we follow Cameron et al. (2011)
and use “cmgreg” command in Stata to cluster standard errors separately by
province and country of origin (two-way clustering). This results in 88 clusters
in the short-term analysis. Note that two-way clustering differs from clustering
at the intersection of the two groupings. The latter would have been inadequate,
since it imposes the restriction that observations are independent if they refer
to people from the same country of origin but residing in different Italian
provinces (see Bertrand et al. 2004 and Cameron and Miller 2015).
Nevertheless, in section 7, we also check the sensitivity of our results by
clustering standard errors solely at the country of origin level (11 clusters) using
the wild bootstrap method (Cameron et al. 2008) with 1,000 replications to
account for the small number of clusters.
26 One drawback is that household income information is not available for survey
years earlier than 2007. Therefore, we use the respondent’s labour income as a
proxy of the household income (the correlation coefficient between household
income and respondent’s labour income in our sample is around 0.27 for the
years 2007–2012). Dropping the respondent’s labour income from our preferred
specification, leaves our main results unchanged.
27 As an additional robustness check, we performed two “placebo” exercises, in
which we: (i) restrict the time period to (a) years 2005 to 2006 and (b) years
2004 to 2005 prior to enlargement, (ii) set the year 2006 (exercise 1) and the
year 2005 (exercise 2), instead of year 2007, as post and (iii) set the year 2005
(exercise 1) and the year 2004 (exercise 2), instead of year 2006, as pre. Using
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consumption expenditure, i.e., basic need items (food and clothing), housing
and durables (transportation, leisure, instalment purchases and debt) that
account on average for around 40%, 40% and 20% of total consumption,
respectively. According to our estimates, the positive effect is significant for
expenditure on basic need items (panel B) and on durables (panel D), but
there is no immediate significant effect on housing expenditure (panel C).
Our estimates imply that with the EU accession, Romanian and Bulgarian
households residing in Italy increased their expenditure on food, consumption
and other basic needs of around 7.7%, which is similar in magnitude to the
effect on total consumption and their expenditure on less basic needs and
durable goods around 14%.
Next, we estimate a specification similar to equation (1) of the form
ln(cicpt)=α +γnewEUc ×postt +
individual controls︷ ︸︸ ︷
Xicptθ
+ Zicptϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
household
controls
+ φc︸︷︷︸
country of
origin FE
+ ηp︸︷︷︸
province
FE
+ λt︸︷︷︸
year
FE
+ξicpt, (2)
where we include observations from all available years, 2004–2012, and control
for year fixed effects (λt) to capture the common time trends in the monthly
consumption expenditure of the treatment and the control groups and the
changes in macroeconomic variables (e.g., inflation). In equation (2), postt is
a dummy variable that takes the value one in the year of enlargement and
afterwards (2007–2012), and zero otherwise. The terms new EUc and postt
are not shown because their coefficients are absorbed by the country of origin
(φc) and year fixed effects (λt), respectively.
We focus on the estimated coefficient of the variable new EUc × postt,
which measures the medium-run average effect of the 2007 EU enlargement
and present our results in table 3. The effects on total consumption, basic
need items and durables are slightly smaller than the estimated short-run
effects, but positive and statistically significant in line with the short-term
analysis. The only exception to this is the effect on basic needs, which be-
comes insignificant when labour income is controlled for (panel B, column 4).
Differently from the short-term results, we also detect a positive effect on
housing when we consider up to six years after the enlargement. This sug-
gests that immigrants from newly accessed countries also increase housing
expenditures but the effect takes some time to materialize. To explore this
possibility, in the next section, we examine the effect of the EU enlargement
by using a year-by-year specification.
the full specification, in both exercises the placebo effect on total consumption
is statistically insignificant and close to zero, validating our analyses presented
above (see online appendix table B1).
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5.2. Pre-trends and persistence
In order to test the validity of our analysis, we now adopt a year-by-year
specification as in Autor (2003) that allows us to test for parallel trends but
also to examine the persistence of the effect. For this purpose, we augment
equation (1) with lags and leads of the treatment as given by equation (3):
ln(cicpt)=α +
leads and lags of the treatment
︷ ︸︸ ︷
5∑
j=−3
γjDicpt(t=2007+ j)×newEUc
Xicptθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
individual
controls
+ Zicptϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
household
controls
+ φc︸︷︷︸
country of
origin FE
+ ηp︸︷︷︸
province
FE
+ λt︸︷︷︸
year
FE
+ξicpt,
(3)
where Dicpt(.) is an indicator variable for each year of the interview t. For j =0,
the estimate of the parameter γj is the immediate effect of the enlargement
in 2007, which is comparable to the coefficient estimate γ in equation (1).
Moreover, if the estimates of γj for j = −3, −2 and −1 are not statistically
significant, we can conclude that the trends between the treated and the
control group in the period before the EU enlargement (2004–2006) were
parallel, which is crucial for the validity of our difference-in-differences es-
timation. Furthermore, the γj for j >0 are informative about the persistence
of the effect, i.e., whether the increase in consumption after the enlargement
is permanent or temporary.
Table 4 and figure 2 show the results that we obtain from this generalized
method, with 2004 being the reference year. First, the coefficients for 2005
and 2006 are not statistically different from zero confirming the validity of
the parallel trends assumption. Furthermore, the estimates for 2007 are in
line with those obtained by (1) as we find a positive and significant effect
on total consumption, as well as on expenditure on food, clothing and other
basic needs (panel B) and on transportation, leisure, instalment purchases
and debt (panel D), but no significant effect on housing expenditure (panel C)
in the short run, with the estimated coefficients for the interaction between
new EUc and year 2007 being similar in magnitude to those presented in
table 2 (new EUc × post). The coefficients of total consumption expenditure
and of its subcategories are statistically significant and positive in various
years after 2007, suggesting that the results of the EU enlargement do not
vanish. Moreover, the positive effect on housing expenditures emerges in the
medium run (2010) in line with the results presented in table 3. In the next
section, we explore whether improved employment conditions lie behind these
effects providing a possible explanation for their pattern and discussing the
role of the precautionary savings motive.
6. Mechanisms
One of the most important benefits for the immigrants of the new EU member
countries is the right to work in all EU countries without the need of a work
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permit. As discussed in section 3, Italy had initially announced that it would
impose interim restrictions to protect its labour market just like other EU
countries did. However, just a few days before the accession Romanians and
Bulgarians acquired full rights to work in Italy. This could have direct effects
on the employment probability and the labour income of our treated group,
which may explain the increase in the immigrant household consumption that
we documented in the previous section. In fact, after the EU enlargement,
the labour income and the percentage of those with permanent contracts
increased among immigrants in the treated group (by 6% and 8 percentage
points, respectively) while they remained fairly constant among immigrants
in the control group (see table 1). Moreover, before the EU enlargement
20% of immigrants in our treated group were undocumented and 29% were
working informally. After the EU enlargement, they all became documented
(as they gained EU citizenship) and the percentage of informality decreased
sharply—yet did not disappear—to 18%. At the same time the percentage of
undocumented and of those working informally decreased only slightly among
immigrants in the control group.
Table 5 presents the results of regressions for different labour market
aspects.28 We observe a positive labour force participation effect after the
accession (column 1) and a positive, though not statistically significant, em-
ployment effect (column 2). Indeed, most immigrants who were legal residents
before the accession were already employed since obtaining a work permit is
the most common way of becoming documented in Italy (Mastrobuoni and
Pinotti 2015). Moreover, even undocumented immigrants tend to work but in
the shadow economy.29 Note that the ISMU data contain information both for
the formal and the informal employment, and thus it is not puzzling that the
probability of employment did not increase significantly. What did increase
after the EU enlargement is the labour income (column 3). The increase in
the labour income is in line with Ruhs (2017), who finds that labour earnings
of Eastern European immigrants in the UK have increased after the accession
of their home countries in the EU.30 Our data allow us to further explore
whether the increase in the labour income that we observe in our setting has
occurred by immigrants moving out of the shadow economy. Indeed, as shown
28 The ISMU data contain information on labour market outcomes in all available
waves (2001–2012). We estimate linear probability models for the probability of
working informally and the probability of holding a permanent contract.
29 In our sample, 65% of all documented immigrants have a residence permit for
work reasons, while 74% of all undocumented immigrants work and all do so in
the informal sector.
30 While comparable long-term estimates are not available, Ruhs (2017) finds that
the impact of gaining EU status on the earnings of A8 employees in the UK is
in the order of 0.06 to 0.08 over a period of six to eight months. This is quite
similar in magnitude to our results (captured by the coefficient estimate of new
EU x Year 2007 in table 5, column 3).
26 E. Adamopoulou and E. Kaya
FIGURE 2 Estimated effect of EU enlargement on the log monthly consumption
expenditure of immigrant households from new EU member countries before,
during and after the EU accession
NOTE: Sample includes immigrants from Romania, Bulgaria and candidate countries
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia
and Turkey) who arrived in Italy before 2007, who do not hold Italian citizenship by the
time of the interview, with no more than 10 years of residence in Italy by the time of the
EU accession and with non-missing information on all variables included in equation (3).
Each black dot displays the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between new EU
indicator and the corresponding year from the full specification. The 95% confidence
interval is constructed using the two way clustered (at Italian province of residence and at
country of origin level) standard errors. The vertical line represents the date of the EU
accession of Romania and Bulgaria (January 1, 2007).
DATA SOURCE: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) 2004–2012 surveys
in column 4, we find a strong decrease in the probability of working in the
informal sector in the period 2007–2011, consistent with this argument.31 ,32
We then repeat the analysis on labour income, but only for those employed
in the formal sector, and the positive effects essentially disappear (column 5).
This suggests that the large increase in labour income reported in column 3
could be indirectly attributed to undocumented immigrants moving out of the
shadow economy. For formal sector employees, we find instead a significant
31 The variable informal sector takes the value one if an individual is working in
the informal sector and zero if the individual is working in the formal sector.
32 As we discuss in section 7.2, social benefits such as welfare or unemployment
benefits are unlikely to have played a role in the Italian context during the
period of our analysis.
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increase in the probability of having a permanent contract in the years 2008
and 2009 (column 6).33
An alternative explanation for our results might be that the immigrant
households’ consumption response is due to the change in the residence legal
status associated with the EU accession. In fact, Dustmann et al. (2017)
analyze the effect of immigrants’ legal status on their consumption behaviour
and find that undocumented immigrants consume about 40% less than doc-
umented immigrants. As a result of gaining EU citizenship, all Romanian
and Bulgarian immigrants in Italy were documented after 2007. Although
the ISMU data provide information on current legal status, there is no in-
formation on former legal status (before the EU enlargement). Due to their
cross-sectional nature, it is also not possible to distinguish between those
immigrants from the newly accessed countries that were legalized by the
EU enlargement, and those that were legally residing in Italy already before.
Likewise, there is no retrospective information on informal/formal work. Still,
we are able to single out a particular set of immigrants, for whom we can infer
that they were both residing legally and working in the formal sector before
the accession of their home country in the EU. We do so by focusing on a
subsample of documented immigrants who reported in 2007 to have a valid
residence permit for (dependent) work. The rationale behind our strategy
is that the respondents in our treatment group should have obtained the
permit (i.e., legally residing and working in the formal sector in Italy as an
employee) before the EU enlargement, since there was no need for them to
obtain or renew it in 2007 after the EU accession.34 ,35 This strategy has the
advantage of identifying the set of immigrants, for whom the EU enlargement
basically implied that they did not need to renew their permits any more
as opposed to undocumented immigrants or those working informally, who
derived more tangible benefits from becoming documented and in many cases
by moving to the formal sector. We thus replicate our short-term analysis
using this particular group of immigrants. These results are reported in table 6
columns 1 to 4. We observe that the estimated effect on food, clothing and
33 We also examine possible effects on the probability of part-time versus full-time
employment (intensive margin of labour supply) but do not detect any
statistically significant effect (see online appendix table B2).
34 As discussed in section 2, work permits in Italy expire after one or two years,
depending on the type of contract (temporary/permanent). Therefore, we can
identify immigrants that were documented and working formally before the
enlargement only in the short run.
35 Although there is no retrospective information on informal/formal work, we
assume that immigrants who hold a residence permit for dependent work were
working in the formal sector since this is the only way to obtain the permit.
Indeed, among the documented immigrants in our sample in 2006, 97% of those
who were holding a residence permit for dependent work were actually working
in the formal sector.
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other basic needs turns to be insignificant for immigrants who were legal
already before the enlargement. On the other hand, there is an increase in their
total consumption expenditure driven mainly by the increase in household
consumption of durable goods such as transportation, instalment purchases
and debt.
In table 6, columns 5 and 6 focus on the treatment effect on labour market
outcomes in the short run for this subgroup of formerly legal immigrants in
order to explore the underlying mechanism behind the response in consump-
tion. The small and insignificant estimates on labour income (column 5) and
on the probability of having a permanent contract (column 6) suggest that
the labour market outcomes of immigrants from newly accessed countries,
who had a valid permit and were working in the formal sector even before
2007, were not immediately affected by the EU enlargement. This is not
surprising since transitions into permanent contracts usually take time. Given
that the ISMU data do not allow us to explore the long-term effects of the EU
enlargement on the labour market outcomes of this subgroup of immigrants,
we provide further evidence using data from the Italian Social Security (INPS)
records. The Social Security data contain information for a 6.5% random
sample of all private sector employees in Italy (see online appendix A for
further details). Due to their administrative nature, these data include only
immigrants that are working in the formal labour market as employees, who in
principle correspond to the ISMU subsample of documented immigrants with
a valid work permit.36 ,37 To have comparable results with the ISMU data, we
restrict the sample to immigrants that work in a firm located in Lombardy
and appear at least once in the Social Security data before 2007 with less than
10 years of experience.38 An advantage of the Social Security data is that we
can also observe daily wages, which, unlike monthly wages in the ISMU data,
do not reflect changes in the labour supply. Online appendix table B3 reports
the descriptive statistics of our sample. We see that the treated and the control
groups experience similar increases in daily and monthly wages after the EU
enlargement. However, there is an increase in the percentage of workers with
a permanent contract only among the treated.
The panel nature of the administrative data allows us to follow individuals
over time and to perform a regression analysis with worker and firm fixed
effects.39 In this way we are able to account for unobserved heterogeneity
without the extensive list of controls that were available in the ISMU data
and were important to include in a repeated cross-sectional setting. Table 7
36 Hotchkiss et al. (2015) show that administrative data in the US may actually
include a small number of undocumented immigrants with “fake” fiscal code.
37 As it is often common with administrative data, we are not able to distinguish
unemployment from non-participation in the Social Security Records.
38 Since we lack information on the year of arrival in Italy, we use the date of
entry in the labour market as a proxy of the arrival date.
39 We cluster standards errors at the worker and year level.
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TABLE 7
Estimated effect of EU enlargement on the labour market outcomes of immigrant
households from new EU member countries (2001–2012), immigrants who were
working formally before accession
Monthly wage Daily wage Permanent
(in log) (in log) contract
(1) (2) (3)
New EU x Year 2002 −0.003 −0.001 0.020
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
New EU x Year 2003 0.010 0.000 0.015
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016)
New EU x Year 2004 −0.001 −0.007 0.019
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017)
New EU x Year 2005 0.013 0.011 0.022
(0.015) (0.012) (0.018)
New EU x Year 2006 0.002 0.007 0.023
(0.016) (0.013) (0.019)
New EU x Year 2007 −0.000 −0.000 0.032
(0.016) (0.013) (0.018)
New EU x Year 2008 0.008 −0.004 0.041*
(0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
New EU x Year 2009 0.009 0.003 0.038*
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020)
New EU x Year 2010 0.001 −0.008 0.039*
(0.018) (0.014) (0.020)
New EU x Year 2011 −0.003 −0.008 0.051**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.021)
New EU x Year 2012 0.019 0.007 0.037
(0.019) (0.014) (0.021)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 38,081 38,081 38,081
Adjusted R2 0.603 0.681 0.697
NOTES: *p< 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Two-way clustered standard errors (at
worker level and at year level) are in parentheses. All specifications include year,
worker and firm fixed effects (FEs). Sample includes immigrants that work in a
firm located in Lombardy and appeared at least once in the social security records
before 2007 with less than 10 years of experience.
DATA SOURCE: Italian Social Security (INPS) records 2001–2012
reports the results of this analysis. There is no statistically significant effect on
monthly (column 1) or daily (column 2) wages, while the probability of having
a permanent contract increases from 2008 onwards (column 3). Moreover,
pre-trends seem to be parallel as the coefficient estimates are not statistically
significant in the period before the enlargement. The regression estimates
confirm the cross sectional results from the ISMU survey (table 5, columns
5 and 6) and suggest that although legalization is not the reason behind
it, employers reacted positively to the fact that Romanians and Bulgarians
did not need to pass anymore through the tedious bureaucratic procedure
of renewing their work permit. In other words, the new legal framework after
the EU accession acted as a “permanent” work permit. Increased employment
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stability reduced the uncertainty for future labour income, which in turn
increased their consumption expenditure. This result is in line with Gathmann
and Keller (2018) who find that faster access to citizenship for immigrants in
Germany has improved their labour market attachment.
The above labour market story is broadly consistent with the pattern of
our consumption results. We observe an immediate increase in consumption in
2007 and then again a few years later. The former is due to the increase in food,
clothing and other basic need expenditures by the previously undocumented
immigrants whose labour income rises but also due to the increase in durable
goods by the previously documented immigrants working in the formal sector.
Although the latter did not experience any increase in labour income, they
might have anticipated that they would be able to access a permanent job
in the future. Our analysis supports this hypothesis as consumption increases
again after having obtained the permanent contract.
It is also worth noting that these results are suggestive of a reduced
precautionary savings motive. To verify this, we use the ISMU data that
include some information on average monthly savings in Italy as well as on
average monthly remittances. Unlike consumption expenditure, the informa-
tion on remittances and savings in the ISMU data is imperfect (Dustmann
et al. 2017).40 Regarding savings, we have information only on savings held
in the host country but not on savings held in the home country. Ideally,
we would like to have a measure of total savings (both in Italy and in the
home country) in order to be able to analyze precautionary savings.41 In
relation to remittances, the ISMU survey asks respondents to report the
average amount they send home each month, which is subject to measurement
error, especially if transfers take alternative forms than sending money or
are less frequent. Moreover, remittances may either end up as savings or
investment in the home country or finance the consumption expenditures of
family members who do not live in Italy.42 This is why we study the two
variables (savings in Italy and remittances) both separately and jointly as a
composite measure of total savings. As many immigrant households in our
sample report zero savings and/or remittances (42% and 47% of all cases,
40 Total household income can be written as the sum of consumption and total
savings, where total savings are the sum of savings and remittances. It turns
out that computed household income coincides with the reported household
income (available in 2007 and onwards) only in 58% of the cases, suggesting
that there is considerable measurement error in savings and remittances as
discussed in Dustmann et al. (2017).
41 Dustmann and Mestres (2010a) show that not accounting for savings in the
home country may result in distorted conclusions regarding immigrants’ saving
behaviour.
42 Immigrants may remit for a variety of reasons, ranging from altruism, exchange,
inheritance, or strategic motives to family insurance and investment motives
(for an excellent review, see Rapoport and Docquier 2006).
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respectively), in our first set of OLS estimates we follow Dustmann and
Mestres (2010b) and set zero savings and/or remittances equal to 1 and use
log(y+1) as our dependent variable, where y is savings, remittances or the
sum of the two. In our second set of OLS estimates, we use instead the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation of the saving and remittance variables (see,
for example, Clemens and Hunt 2019).43 Then, we adopt a linear probability
model in order to study the extensive margin of savings and remittances.
Table 8 reports the results of three models.44 There is a negative statistically
significant effect on remittances in 2010 and on savings in 2012 irrespective
of the transformation we use. These are years for which we find a positive
effect on housing expenditures (table 4, panel C) and a higher probability
of having a permanent employment contract (table 7, column 3). In line
with Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), who show that undocumented/risky-
income immigrants tend to remit more, and Dustmann and Mestres (2010a
and 2010b), who show that temporary immigrants are likely to remit and
save more, we find that immigrants reduce savings and remittances after the
EU enlargement through legalization and accessing permanent employment
contracts.45
7. Robustness, placebo tests and alternative mechanisms
In this section, we conduct various additional exercises. First, we address
anticipation and spillover effects that are common threats to identification
in a difference-in-differences framework. Second, we examine whether our
estimates are sensitive to the measure of consumption, to the definition of
immigrant households or to the way of clustering, and explore whether the
43 The estimated coefficients in these specifications can be interpreted analogously
to those using a logarithmic transformation. Unlike the logarithmic
transformation, however, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation can
accommodate zero values (see Burbidge et al. 1988).
44 These results should be interpreted with caution for the reasons we described
above regarding the measurement of remittances and savings in the ISMU
survey.
45 Basic accounting implies that household income should be equal to the sum of
consumption plus total savings, where total savings are the sum of savings plus
remittances. Therefore, a simple way to correct for measurement error is to
impute total savings from the difference between household income and
consumption whenever household income is available (i.e., survey years
2007–2012). We re-conduct the analysis using the imputed total savings and
report the results in table B4 in the online appendix. As there are a number of
observations with negative imputed savings, in column 1, we use the
log-modulus transformation, which is defined for zero and negative values (see
John and Draper 1980). The results presented in table B4 suggest a negative
effect on total savings in years 2010, 2011 and 2012, in line with a reduced
precautionary motive.
Not just a work permit 35
TA
B
LE
8
E
st
im
at
ed
eff
ec
t
of
E
U
en
la
rg
em
en
t
on
sa
vi
ng
s
an
d
re
m
it
ta
nc
es
of
im
m
ig
ra
nt
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
fr
om
ne
w
E
U
m
em
be
r
co
un
tr
ie
s
(2
00
4–
20
12
)
O
L
S
O
L
S
L
in
ea
r
pr
ob
ab
il
it
y
m
od
el
L
og
ar
it
hm
(a
m
ou
nt
+
1)
as
in
h(
am
ou
nt
)
(=
1
Y
es
,
=
0
N
o)
P
ro
b(
Sa
ve
Sa
vi
ng
s
R
em
it
ta
nc
es
T
ot
al
Sa
vi
ng
s
R
em
it
ta
nc
es
T
ot
al
P
ro
b(
Sa
ve
)
P
ro
b(
R
em
it
)
or
re
m
it
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
N
ew
E
U
x
Y
ea
r
20
05
0.
59
7
−
0.
21
7
0.
27
5
0.
67
0
−
0.
24
0
0.
30
8
0.
10
6
−
0.
03
4
0.
04
8
(0
.4
99
)
(0
.2
64
)
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.5
64
)
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.2
94
)
(0
.0
95
)
(-
0.
05
8)
(0
.0
47
)
N
ew
E
U
x
Y
ea
r
20
06
−
0.
13
2
−
0.
63
1*
−
0.
30
9
−
0.
15
2
−
0.
71
8*
−
0.
34
8
−
0.
02
9
−
0.
12
6
−
0.
05
6
(0
.3
05
)
(0
.3
25
)
(0
.4
13
)
(0
.3
46
)
(0
.3
72
)
(0
.4
62
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
71
)
N
ew
E
U
x
Y
ea
r
20
07
0.
27
7
−
0.
13
6
0.
03
2
0.
29
8
−
0.
15
8
0.
01
7
0.
02
9
−
0.
03
2
−
0.
02
3
(0
.4
09
)
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.4
07
)
(0
.4
62
)
(0
.3
44
)
(0
.4
50
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.0
62
)
N
ew
E
U
x
Y
ea
r
20
08
−
0.
12
5
−
0.
05
1
0.
05
3
−
0.
16
5
−
0.
05
6
0.
04
8
−
0.
05
9
−
0.
00
6
−
0.
00
8
(0
.2
94
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.2
46
)
(0
.3
33
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.2
76
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
44
)
N
ew
E
U
x
Y
ea
r
20
09
0.
17
8
−
0.
17
1
0.
26
9
0.
18
5
−
0.
20
1
0.
29
1
0.
01
0
−
0.
04
4
0.
03
2
(0
.3
36
)
(0
.3
16
)
(0
.3
27
)
(0
.3
79
)
(0
.3
58
)
(0
.3
69
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
62
)
N
ew
E
U
x
Y
ea
r
20
10
−
0.
13
6
−
0.
75
7*
**
−
0.
36
8
−
0.
18
5
−
0.
87
6*
**
−
0.
44
4
−
0.
07
3
−
0.
17
4*
**
−
0.
11
3*
**
(0
.3
58
)
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.2
53
)
(0
.3
93
)
(0
.2
03
)
(0
.2
77
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
37
)
N
ew
E
U
x
Y
ea
r
20
11
0.
30
9
0.
07
3
0.
23
5
0.
33
2
0.
08
2
0.
25
0
0.
03
2
0.
01
3
0.
02
0
(0
.3
33
)
(0
.2
73
)
(0
.3
76
)
(0
.3
76
)
(0
.3
06
)
(0
.4
21
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
67
)
N
ew
E
U
x
Y
ea
r
20
12
−
0.
67
7*
−
0.
46
8
−
0.
75
3*
**
−
0.
77
2*
−
0.
53
7
−
0.
84
9*
**
−
0.
13
9*
−
0.
09
9
−
0.
14
0*
**
(0
.4
04
)
(0
.3
32
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.4
55
)
(0
.3
77
)
(0
.2
01
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
32
)
Y
ea
r
du
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
ou
nt
ry
of
or
ig
in
du
m
.
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
P
ro
vi
nc
e
du
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
In
di
vi
du
al
co
nt
ro
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
H
ou
se
ho
ld
co
nt
ro
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
L
ab
ou
r
in
co
m
e
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o.
of
ob
s.
4,
23
3
4,
23
3
4,
23
3
4,
23
3
4,
23
3
4,
23
3
4,
23
3
4,
23
3
4,
23
3
A
dj
us
te
d
R
2
0.
16
3
0.
20
8
0.
20
9
0.
16
1
0.
20
4
0.
20
4
0.
13
6
0.
17
3
0.
15
9
N
O
T
E
S:
*p
<
0.
10
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
**
*p
<
0.
01
.
as
in
h
is
in
ve
rs
e
hy
p
er
b
ol
ic
si
ne
.
T
w
o-
w
ay
cl
us
te
re
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
(a
t
It
al
ia
n
pr
ov
in
ce
of
re
si
de
nc
e
an
d
at
co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
le
ve
l)
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
(1
21
cl
us
te
rs
).
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
ye
ar
,
co
un
tr
y
of
or
ig
in
an
d
It
al
ia
n
pr
ov
in
ce
of
re
si
de
nc
e
fi
xe
d
eff
ec
ts
an
d
a
co
ns
ta
nt
te
rm
.
In
di
vi
du
al
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
’s
ge
nd
er
,
ag
e,
ag
e
sq
ua
re
d,
du
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
ed
uc
at
io
n
le
ve
l
(n
on
e,
pr
im
ar
y,
se
co
nd
ar
y,
te
rt
ia
ry
)
an
d
ye
ar
s
of
re
si
de
nc
e
in
It
al
y.
H
ou
se
ho
ld
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
ud
e
an
in
di
ca
to
r
fo
r
ha
vi
ng
a
sp
ou
se
li
vi
ng
ab
ro
ad
,
nu
m
b
er
of
ho
us
eh
ol
d
m
em
b
er
s,
nu
m
b
er
of
ch
il
dr
en
,
nu
m
b
er
of
co
ha
bi
ti
ng
ch
il
dr
en
,
nu
m
b
er
of
co
ha
bi
ti
ng
no
n
ad
ul
t
ch
il
dr
en
an
d
a
du
m
m
y
fo
r
li
vi
ng
in
ow
n
pr
op
er
ty
in
It
al
y.
L
ab
ou
r
in
co
m
e
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
m
on
th
ly
la
b
ou
r
in
co
m
e
(n
et
of
ta
xe
s)
of
th
e
re
sp
on
de
nt
.
Se
e
on
li
ne
ap
p
en
di
x
A
fo
r
va
ri
ab
le
de
fi
ni
ti
on
s
an
d
sa
m
pl
e
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
.
D
A
T
A
SO
U
R
C
E
:
In
st
it
ut
e
fo
r
M
ul
ti
et
hn
ic
St
ud
ie
s
(I
SM
U
)
su
rv
ey
s
20
04
–2
01
2
36 E. Adamopoulou and E. Kaya
business cycle or changes in household structure over time drive our results.
Third, we consider selective out-migration (composition effects) and omitted
variables/unobserved heterogeneity. Lastly, we perform a placebo exercise and
discuss alternative mechanisms that may lie behind our findings.
7.1. Robustness checks
We start by performing a series of exercises to examine the robustness of
our benchmark estimates (table 4, panel A, column 4) and present these
results in table 9. First, we proceed by looking at anticipation effects as
treated households that moved to Italy prior to the EU enlargement may
have somehow anticipated that the labour market restrictions would have not
been implemented. We thus restrict our sample to those that had migrated
in Italy at least one year before 2007, and present these results in column
1. Both the short- and the medium-run effects of the EU enlargement on
the total household consumption of the Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants
remain positive and significant, suggesting that our results are not driven by
anticipation.46
Second, we try to understand whether there are any spillover effects be-
tween the treated and the control group (the so-called SUTVA; see Rubin
1977). In particular, if the treated and the control group competed for the
same jobs, the EU accession could not only benefit the treated but also neg-
atively affect the control, undermining our difference-in-differences strategy.
To address this issue, we first compare provinces where the treated and the
control group were of similar size before 2007 to provinces where the treated
group was the minority. The idea behind our strategy is that spillover effects
should be stronger in provinces where the treated and the control groups are
of similar size (potentially through the competition in the labour market) than
in provinces where the treatment group was a minority. The effect of the EU
enlargement on consumption is not different between the two sets suggesting
that SUTVA is likely to be satisfied in our setting (see online appendix figure
B3 and table B5). A similar picture emerges when we compare occupations
that experienced an increase in the fraction of the treated group after the
enlargement with industries/occupations that did not (see online appendix
figure B4 and table B6).
We then check the sensitivity of our analysis to the alternative measures
of consumption. In particular, we use individual consumption calculated as
the ratio between household consumption and the number of members of the
household residing in Italy, converted into equalized adults using the standard
46 In online appendix table B7, we further restrict the sample to those who had
migrated in Italy at least two years before the EU enlargement (column 1) and
then three years before (column 2). The latter corresponds to immigrants who
arrived in Italy even before the end of EU accession negotiations of Bulgaria and
Romania in 2004. Restricting the sample even for those who arrived in Italy well
before the announcement of the policy makes no difference to this conclusion.
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OECD equivalence scale, which assigns a weighting of 1 to the first adult,
0.7 to the second and each subsequent adult and 0.5 to each child.47 These
results are presented in table 9, column 2, and in line with our benchmark
estimates presented in table 4 (panel A, column 4).48
An additional robustness exercise is to use as an alternative control group
the immigrants from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (together referred to as the A8 countries)
that accessed the EU in 2004. The advantage of using the nationals of
A8 countries as a control group is that they are unlikely to be affected by the
EU enlargement since they acquired the EU citizenship already in 2004. Thus,
possible spillover effects are not a concern in this setting. These results are
presented in table 9, column 3. Comparison of these results to our benchmark
estimates in table 4 shows that they are quite similar in magnitude, although
the coefficients are less precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size.
Next, we check the sensitivity of our analysis to the definition of the
immigrant households’ country of origin. Throughout our analysis, we consider
a household being from a particular country if the respondent is from that
country. Although the ISMU data do not include information on the nation-
ality of each family member, there was a question on whether the partner
and the respondent came from the same country of origin (in case the partner
was listed among the cohabiting household members in Italy). This piece of
information is available in the survey years 2006–2012 but not in 2004–2005.
As a robustness check, we restrict our sample to immigrants who either do
not live with a partner in Italy or live with a partner from the same country
of origin. Estimating our benchmark model for this subgroup of immigrants
does not alter our results in any way (column 4).
As discussed in section 4, consumption expenditure might be correlated
within the country of origin groups, but also within provinces as immigrants
from the same nationality tend to concentrate/live close to each other. Thus,
throughout our analysis, we use two-way clustered (at Italian province of
residence and at country of origin level), but we also check how robust our
estimates are to different ways of clustering. In particular, we cluster standard
errors only at the country of origin level (11 clusters) and use the wild
bootstrap method proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) with 1,000 replications
47 We explore the sensitivity of the findings to the weighting by using the modified
OECD equivalence scale and the equivalence scale used by ISEE. The estimated
effects, presented in online appendix table B7, columns 3 and 4, are very similar
across these different measures of individual consumption.
48 In these specifications, we do not control for the number of household members
and the number of cohabiting children as this is already taken into account by
the equivalence scale. We still include though controls for the total number of
children and for whether the spouse of the respondent lives abroad in order to
account for non-cohabiting household members.
Not just a work permit 39
to account for the small number of clusters. These results (column 5) are in
line with the benchmark.
During the period of our analysis Italy experienced the Great Recession,
which led to severe job losses. Immigrants were particularly affected as they
tend to be more susceptible to the economic cycle than native-born (Dustmann
et al. 2010). Although in our analysis both the treated and the control group
comprise of immigrants and are therefore exposed to the recession in a similar
way, it may be the case that the two groups were concentrated in provinces
or occupations that were differently affected by the recession. Therefore, we
add to our specification province–year and occupation–year fixed effects in
order to explore whether our results are driven by the business cycle at the
local and occupational level.49 To do so, we restrict the sample to employed
individuals and use available information on the occupation of the immigrant
(e.g., domestic worker, artisan, intellectual, employee in hotels/restaurants,
construction worker, salesperson; see online appendix table B6). The results
after the inclusion of these new set of dummies (column 6) are similar to the
benchmark.
Given that the EU enlargement may have affected the fertility or family
reunification decisions of the immigrants, we include in our specification, in
addition to the controls for the presence of a spouse living with the respondent
in Italy and for the total number of children, their interaction with year
dummies so as to investigate whether changes in the household structure
over time drive the results on consumption (column 7). The estimates of this
further robustness check show that our results are not sensitive to the changes
in the household structure over time.
Another possible threat to our identification strategy is selective out-
migration. It is possible that the composition of our sample changes after the
EU accession given that the treated group acquired the right to move freely
to other countries within the EU or due to return migration. In particular,
mobility may be non-random and treated households that did not prosper
in Italy may decide to leave the country in search of better opportunities
elsewhere in the EU. If the composition of immigrants changed in some
systematic way following the EU enlargement, then we need to take account
of this selection when assessing the effects of EU enlargement on household
consumption expenditure. For this purpose, we estimate a version of equation
(2), where the dependent variable is the immigrants’ characteristics (female,
young, low educated, number of household members). These results are pre-
sented in online appendix table B8. We do not find any significant change in
the composition of our sample following the EU enlargement, confirming the
robustness of our results. Moreover, the ISMU data include direct information
on the intentions of immigrants to leave Italy (to return to the home country
or move to a different country). This information is available only for the
49 Including these controls in our main specification reduces our sample size as the
occupation variable is available only for employed individuals.
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period 2010–2012, so we cannot study the effect of the EU enlargement. Still,
we can check whether the intentions to leave Italy were systematically different
between the treated and the control group for the period 2010–2012. Results in
online appendix table B9 (column 1) show that Romanians and Bulgarians are
not more likely to select into return migration/migration towards a different
country than immigrants from EU candidate countries. This is true also when
we restrict the sample to immigrants who arrived in Italy one or two years
before the enlargement (see online appendix table B9, columns 2 and 3).
Although in our analysis we include a comprehensive set of individual and
household variables, a possible concern is that they may not fully control
for all the relevant characteristics, and thus equation (3) could suffer from
the omitted variables problem. To assess the influence of omitted variables
relative to the one of observed characteristics, we use a method proposed by
Altonji et al. (2005) and calculate the ratio of the influence of unobserved
characteristics relative to the one of observed control variables that would
be required so as to fully explain away our result. The intuition behind this
approach is that if the inclusion of observed control variables substantially
weakens the impact of the EU enlargement, then one would expect that the
inclusion of additional controls (observed or unobserved) would reduce the
estimated effect even further. Conversely, if the inclusion of additional controls
has no substantial effect on the magnitude of the coefficient estimate, then
this will support the causal interpretation. Thus, a large ratio would imply
that the unobserved heterogeneity cannot fully explain away the estimated
effect of EU enlargement. In online appendix table B10, we present this ratio
based on our main results on total consumption (table 4). The reported ratios
are between three and seven, suggesting that in order to attribute the entire
estimated effect of EU enlargement on the total consumption to selection
effects, the influence of unobservable factors would have to be between three
to seven times greater than the one of the observable characteristics. These
values are considered to be high (see, for example, Bellows and Miguel 2009,
Guriev et al. 2019, Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). Therefore, we conclude that
our estimates cannot be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity.
7.2. Placebo exercise and alternative mechanisms
We have seen so far that the EU accession increased the household consump-
tion of the treated with respect to the control and provided evidence that the
improved labour market conditions is a possible underlying mechanism. To
provide additional supporting evidence, we perform a placebo exercise on a
group of immigrants who were unlikely to benefit from the EU accession and
were excluded from our analysis so far. In particular, we focus on immigrants
who either held the Italian citizenship or were eligible to apply for it by 2007
(having resided in Italy for more than 10 years). We compare this group
of immigrants with immigrants in the sample we used for our benchmark
estimates, that we further split between those with less than five years and
those with five to 10 years of residence by 2007. The latter were eligible for
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permanent residence permits and therefore the expected benefits from the
EU accession would be lower for them. Table 10 reports the results for these
three separate groups.50 We verify a positive and statistically significant effect
among immigrants with less than five years of residence by 2007 (column 1),
while the coefficient of the interaction term is still positive but half in size and
not statistically different from zero among immigrants with five to 10 years of
residence (column 2). The effect completely vanishes (and turns even negative)
when we focus instead on immigrants who held or were eligible to apply for
the Italian citizenship by 2007 (column 3). This placebo exercise is consistent
with the notion that immigrants who benefited from the EU accession most
were those not close to acquiring permanent residence or citizenship rights in
Italy.
Still, the labour market mechanism does not exclude other channels that
may have also contributed. More specifically, the EU accession may have
also facilitated the access to credit for the treated households although in our
benchmark specification we do not find any evidence of increased expenditures
regarding housing, at least in the short run (table 2, panel C). A possible
reason is that mortgage payments and rent enter in the same way in the
expenditures for housing. As the ISMU data do not contain any information
on mortgages, we utilize a different data source, the Survey on Income and Life
Conditions of Households with Foreigners conducted by the Italian National
Institute of Statistics in 2009 (see online appendix A), which contains unique
information on whether households have a mortgage and, if they do, the year
they obtained it. We define the treated and the control group in the same
way as in the benchmark exercise and apply the same sample restrictions
and identification strategy but find no clear difference in the fraction of the
treated and control with a mortgage issued immediately before or after the
EU enlargement (see online appendix table B11).51
Another possible mechanism is access to social benefits such as welfare or
unemployment benefits. This mechanism could be more relevant for previously
undocumented immigrants since documented immigrants, as long as they
satisfy the eligibility conditions in terms of income thresholds and previous
work experience, have access to social benefits even before the enlargement.
However, in the period of our analysis (2004–2012), the measures to alleviate
poverty were quite limited in Italy (i.e., a social card for food purchases of up
to 40 euros per month for poor families with children less than three years old
or for the elderly; see Madama et al. 2014). Moreover, Italy was among the
countries with the lowest replacement rate in unemployment (OECD 2009)
50 Due to the sample split, we report the effect for the entire post period
(2007–2012) as the number of observations is too small to perform a
year-by-year analysis.
51 More precisely, there is an increase in the fraction of immigrants with a
mortgage issued after the EU enlargement but this is true both for the
treatment and the control group.
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TABLE 10
Estimated effect of EU enlargement on consumption of immigrant households from new
EU member countries (2004–2012), heterogeneity by years of residence
Immigrants with Immigrants with Immigrants with
less than five 5–10 years of Italian citizenship
years of residence residence or with more than
in 2007 in 2007 10 years of
residence in 2007
(1) (2) (3)
New EU x Post 0.076** 0.031 −0.052
(0.031) (0.028) (0.036)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country of origin dum. Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes
Labour income Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 2,338 2,645 2,393
Adjusted R2 0.435 0.450 0.409
NOTES: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Two-way clustered standard errors (at Italian
province of residence and at country of origin level) are in parentheses (121 clusters).
Immigrants with 5–10 years of residence are eligible for permanent residence permit while
immigrants with more than 10 years of residence are eligible for the Italian citizenship. All
specifications include year, country of origin and Italian province of residence fixed effects
and a constant term. Individual controls include respondent’s gender, age, age squared,
dummies for education level (none, primary, secondary, tertiary) and years of residence in
Italy. Household controls include an indicator for having a spouse living abroad, number
of household members, number of children, number of cohabiting children, number of
cohabiting non adult children and a dummy for living in own property in Italy. Labour
income is the average monthly labour income (net of taxes) of the respondent. See online
appendix A for variable definitions and sample restrictions.
DATA SOURCE: Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU) surveys 2004–2012
and benefits were accessible only by workers with at least two years of social
insurance seniority (Giorgi 2018). Therefore, we expect that social benefits
have played a rather limited role.
At this point it is also worth noting that there is a literature that em-
phasizes the effects of immigration on prices (see, for example, Lach 2007
for Israeli cities, Cortes 2008 for the US cities, Zachariadis 2011 and 2012
for a study of 140 cities in 90 countries). Although the proposed underlying
mechanisms differ, the empirical studies commonly agree that an increase in
immigration reduces prices.52 In relation to our findings, if all prices went
down due to the EU enlargement, this would affect both the treated and
the control group, and hence this would not alter our results. If we assume
that only prices related to certain Romanian and Bulgarian products went
52 For instance, according to Lach (2007), the underlying mechanisms is a
demand-side channel of increased search and higher price elasticities for
immigrants, while Cortes (2008) provides a supply-side explanation (through a
reduction in wages).
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down and that the demand for these products is generally higher among the
treated, then the effect on total consumption expenditure would depend on
the elasticity of these products and on their relative weight in the consumer
basket. Although we cannot rule out this mechanism, we do not expect it to
be the main driver of our results given the range of Romanian and Bulgarian
products available in Italy. Therefore, the improved labour market conditions
continue to be the most plausible underlying mechanism behind the increases
in the household consumption of the treated.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we focus on Romanian and Bulgarian households that migrated
to Italy before 2007 and study whether the accession of their home country
in 2007 affected their consumption behaviour. We find that their average
monthly consumption expenditure increased significantly as soon as their
home country accessed the EU. This increase is not just temporary and it
cannot be attributed to the mere legalization.
On the one hand, immigrants from the new member countries who were
working informally in Italy before the EU accession experience increases in
labour income after the accession by moving away from the shadow economy.
On the other hand, documented immigrants from the new member countries
who were working formally in Italy even before accessing the EU do not
experience wage increases but have an increased probability of getting a
permanent contract after the accession. We conjecture that the resolution
of uncertainty regarding the renewal of work permits has contributed to this
effect. In the new legal framework, work permits did not have to be renewed
for the citizens of the new member countries, making firms more willing to
offer them permanent contracts. Enhanced labour market stability decreases
the uncertainty regarding future labour income, and it consequently increases
household expenditures—particularly those on durables. Our results are ro-
bust to a series of robustness checks addressing anticipation and composition
effects as well as spillovers. We also discuss alternative possible channels, such
as improved access to credit, and we conclude that improved labour market
conditions is the most plausible underlying mechanism.
Our results have important policy implications in a period of increased
legal uncertainty following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the
EU, which is expected to significantly increase the bureaucratic burden of
acquiring work permits. Moreover, our finding of a positive effect of the EU
enlargement on the consumption of immigrant households from new member
states contributes to the recent debate over the possible accession of Albania
and North Macedonia to the EU.
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